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O n March 23, 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran aground in Alaska’s Prince William Sound and released over 250,000 barrels of crude oil, resulting in 1300 miles of oiled shoreline, the deaths of 250,000 birds, 2800 otters, 
over 250 seals, and destruction of nearly uncountable salmon and herring eggs (for 
details, see http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/facts/index.cfm). This event and its after-
math, graphically illustrated to television viewers around the world, ignited debate 
about the environmental risks of oil usage, the adequacy of regulatory oversight, and 
the appropriate compensation for damages suffered. The Exxon spill also ignited 
a debate within the economics profession concerning the adequacy of methods to 
value public goods, particularly when the good in question has limited direct use, 
such as the pristine natural environment of the spill region.
Shortly following the Valdez grounding, as legal and regulatory processes 
began, representatives of the state of Alaska, the U.S. government, and Exxon 
sought expertise in valuing public goods for the purpose of measuring lost 
economic value from the spill. In turn, a therefore relatively obscure technique 
referred to as the contingent valuation method received considerable attention. In 
the contingent valuation method, standard measures of economic value such as 
willingness to pay or willingness to accept are estimated using responses to survey 
questions. In contemporary lingo, contingent valuation is part of a broader category 
of approaches known as stated preference methods, which rely on peoples’ responses 
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to questions about researcher-designed—and therefore hypothetical—changes in 
environmental quality.
The effi cacy of stated preference methods generally, and contingent valuation in 
particular, is no mere academic debate. Billions of dollars are at stake. A contingent valua-
tion study of the damages from the Exxon Valdez spill generated an estimate of $4.9 billion 
(Carson, Mitchell, Hanemann, Kopp, Presser, and Ruud 2003) in lost economic value. 
In contrast, a recreation demand study of the damages from the spill yielded an estimate 
of $3.8 million (Hausman, Leonard, and McFadden 1995). The key explanation for the 
thousand-fold difference is that the estimate from the contingent valuation study is asso-
ciated almost entirely with passive-use or non-use value—the value that people place on 
something simply because it exists, even if they never directly use the good. In contrast, 
the recreation study only measured economic damages arising from the loss of actual 
visits to the area of the spill. The authors of the two Exxon studies acknowledged that 
their methodologies captured distinct values. Carson et al. pointed out that their survey 
of non-Alaskans meant that the values would be almost exclusively associated with passive 
use. Hausman, Leonard, and McFadden (p. 29) likewise wrote: “If $3.8 million seems 
low, the reader must recall that we have estimated only those damages associated with 
recreational use. Damages associated with commercial use or damages associated with so-
called nonuse values are not included in our estimates.” Ultimately the Exxon Valdez case 
was settled through a U.S. District Court consent decree in 1991 (Exxon Valdez Oil Spill 
Council, “Settlement”) that has paid out approximately $1 billion in damages and over 
$2 billion in immediate responses and restoration efforts.
While the conceptual basis for passive use value has been clear since John Krutilla’s 
(1967) contribution in the American Economic Review, the only available  method for 
measuring it relies on stated preferences, which immediately raises questions for econ-
omists. Are stated preference estimates likely to be inaccurate and devoid of useful 
information, or can a well-constructed survey generate accurate predictions? After all, 
economists have long favored analysis that is based on what people do rather than 
what they say. Given the high stakes involved, stated preference methods came under 
intense scrutiny during the Exxon legal battle. In its wake, the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in 1992 charged a “Blue Ribbon” panel with 
the task of studying the effi cacy of the conginent valuation method (Arrow, Solow, 
Portney, Leamer, Radner, and Schuman 1993). An infl uential symposium appearing 
in this journal in 1994 subsequently provided arguments for and against the credibility 
of the method, and an extensive research program published in academic journals has 
continued to this day. The disparity between the estimates of passive use values and 
direct use values provide ample explanation for this scrutiny, but it is worth empha-
sizing that for pristine wilderness areas, passive use may be the largest component of 
value—and stated preference may be the only game in town when it comes to estima-
tion. Thus, if stated preference approaches are deemed unreliable and environmental 
damage assessment is limited to direct impacts such as lost productivity, health effects, 
damaged fi sheries, displaced recreation, and similar pathways, then the damage from 
oil spills, toxic releases, and other accidents in remote locations may result in compara-
tively small monetized losses.
Catherine L. Kling, Daniel J. Phaneuf, and Jinhua Zhao     5
On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil rig affi liated with BP suffered an 
explosion, triggering the release of nearly fi ve million barrels of crude oil into the 
Gulf of Mexico—a spill 20 times as large as the Exxon Valdez. The accident again 
led to oiled beaches, the death of seabirds and marine wildlife, and the altering of 
poorly understood and complex ecosystems. As we write, economists and attorneys 
are at work drawing on existing studies and undertaking new ones to estimate the 
economic damages from the spill. Much of the work being conducted as part of 
the legal process is confi dential and ongoing, though early evidence from a recre-
ation study (Alvarez, Larkin, Whitehead, and Haab 2012) and a contingent valuation 
survey (Larkin 2012) is shortly to appear. BP has already set up a $20 billion trust 
fund for remediation of environmental damages, of which $6 billion was spent as 
of mid 2012 (Guarino 2012). The large amounts of money involved are once again 
likely to spur fundamental questions about the veracity of the public goods valua-
tion methods available to economists. This time, however, two decades of research 
are on the table to guide the work and inform the debate.
The goal of this paper is to assess what occurred in the academic literature 
between the Exxon spill and the BP disaster in order to shed light on the funda-
mental question of the validity of contingent valuation and, more generally, stated 
preference methods. The two oil spills provide useful bookends for our discussion, 
and the drama surrounding them helps highlight the importance of public goods 
valuation for policy and litigation purposes. We stress, however, that the issue of 
stated preference effi cacy is much broader than valuing damages from oil spills, 
and so most of the discussion that follows will be in a more general framework. 
In particular, we summarize the most salient fi ndings from the now large stated 
preference literature.1 The fundamental question is straightforward: are the values 
elicited from stated preference methods reliable enough to use in policy analysis 
and/or litigation? We will rely on theoretical developments, neoclassical and behav-
ioral paradigms, empirical and experimental evidence, and a clearer elucidation of 
validity criteria to provide a framework for readers to ponder this question. Before 
doing so, however, we fi rst provide a bit of history and then some necessary back-
ground on stated preference methods.
Historical Perspective
A search on the Thomson Reuters Web of Science using “contingent valuation” 
as the topic returns only 49 journal articles as of 1989. These papers, along with 
important books by Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze (1986) and Mitchell and 
 1 We make no attempt to review thoroughly the now extensive stated preference literature. Several 
reviews trace the literature from the earliest published suggestion of the method (Ciriacy-Wantrap 1947) 
and its fi rst implementation by Davis (1963), through the refi nements and applications studied in the 
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. See for example Randall, Ives, and Eastman (1974), Cummings, Brookshire, 
and Schulze (1986), Mitchell and Carson (1989), Carson, Flores, and Meade (2001), Carson and Hane-
mann (2005), and Bennett (2011).
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Carson (1989), comprised the bulk of the published literature at that time. Shortly 
after the Exxon Valdez spill, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which 
specifi cally included lost passive use value as a compensable damage. Congress 
charged the NOAA with identifying methods to value these damages and, facing the 
fallout from the Exxon debate, NOAA commissioned a panel chaired by Kenneth 
Arrow and Robert Solow and charged it with answering a deceptively simple ques-
tion: Is the contingent valuation method capable of providing estimates of lost 
nonuse values that are reliable enough to be used in natural resource damage assess-
ments? (The panel was also asked to consider whether passive use should be part of 
damage assessment, but its affi rmative answer has not generated the same attention 
as its other fi ndings, and so we do not consider it further here.) In January 1993, 
after reviewing the available literature and accepting testimony from researchers, 
the NOAA Panel provided its answer (Arrow, Solow, Portney, Leamer, Radner, and 
Schuman 1993, p. 43):
[W]e identify a number of stringent guidelines for the conduct of CV [contin-
gent valuation] studies. . . . The Panel concludes that under those conditions 
(and others specifi ed above), CV studies relay useful information. We think 
it is fair to describe such information as reliable by the standards that seem 
to be implicit in similar contexts, like market analysis for new and innovative 
products and the assessment of other damages normally allowed in court pro-
ceedings. . . . Thus, the Panel concludes that CV studies can produce estimates 
reliable enough to be the starting point of a judicial process of damage assess-
ment, including lost passive-use values.
However, the panel left no doubt that its members had very strong reserva-
tions with the method and emphasized their concern about several potential biases 
and problems identifi ed in the literature at that time. They also provided a set of 
guidelines that effectively established a list of best practices for the design and 
implementation of contingent valuation surveys.
In reaching their conclusions, the panel cited evidence from only two studies 
that compared contingent valuation estimates to elicited actual values for public 
goods and three studies that compared contingent valuation responses with elicited 
prices for private goods. Based in part on these early tests of the method’s accu-
racy, the panel concluded “that hypothetical markets tend to overstate willingness 
to pay for private as well as public goods.” In the 1994 symposium in this journal, 
NOAA panel member Paul Portney (1994) provided an introduction to the contin-
gent valuation methodology and traced the key legal and policy developments up 
through the completion of the panel’s report. In two additional papers, W. Michael 
Hanemann (1994) argued in favor of the method and Peter Diamond and Jerry 
Hausman (1994) argued against, with the latter authors raising the provocative 
question “is some number better than no number?”
With the luxury of hindsight, it is now clear that considerable work remained to 
be done— either to provide convincing evidence of the method’s accuracy or its lack 
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thereof. First, a commonly accepted set of criteria on how to judge whether stated 
preference studies were adequate for a given task was missing from the vernacular. 
Second, it was apparent that more theoretical work was needed to understand if and 
when stated preference studies should be expected to provide unbiased assessments 
of the underlying economic values. Finally, much empirical work was needed to test 
the theory and methods in a wide variety of empirical settings.
The economics profession has risen to the challenge. In contrast to the small 
literature available at the time of the Exxon spill, by 2010 when the BP disaster 
occurred, at least 25 books and over 2,500 additional journal articles had been 
published on contingent valuation. This count likely understates the full collection 
in that newer types of stated preference studies, including choice experiments, may 
not be fl agged under the “contingent valuation” search. In addition, Carson (2011) 
has amassed a bibliography of over 7,500 studies, which includes many works not 
published in the peer-reviewed literature.
Stated Preference Methods: A Short Primer
In this section, we frame our discussion of stated preference accuracy by placing 
it within the larger context of valuing public goods, also referred to as nonmarket 
valuation, and explaining a few basics on how it works.2 Two general approaches 
are available. One makes use of private behavior in related markets to measure the 
economic value of a nonmarket good such as environmental quality. For example, 
data on how far people are willing to travel to reach an outdoor recreation destina-
tion of a given quality can be used to estimate the tradeoffs people make between 
money spent on travel and environmental quality at recreation sites. This type of 
approach is known as revealed preference. Hedonic analysis of housing markets is 
another common type of revealed preference approach routinely applied to envi-
ronmental goods. Rather than indirectly inferring value from activity in related 
markets, stated preference approaches directly question individuals via surveys to 
obtain the information needed to value the nonmarket good. In both approaches, 
the objective is to measure economic value for a change in a nonmarket good by 
predicting respondents’ willingness to pay, or willingness to accept, for the change. 
For an increase in environmental quality, willingness to pay (more formally, 
“compensating variation”) is the most the individual would be willing to exchange 
to achieve the improvement. Likewise willingness to accept (“equivalent variation”) 
is the least the individual would accept to forgo the improvement.
There are different types of stated preference approaches. The best-known, 
and the subject of the Exxon-era debates, is contingent valuation. In a contingent 
valuation survey, people are asked questions directly related to their willingness to 
 2 For more complete treatments, see Champ, Boyle, and Brown (2003), Batemen et al. (2002), or 
Phaneuf and Requate (forthcoming). For a review of the large literature using stated preference method 
in health economics see de Bekker-Grob, Ryan, and Gerard (2012).
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pay for a specifi c environmental program, commonly in the form of a yes/no answer 
to a posted price. A second type of stated preference approach is a choice experi-
ment (Louiviere, Hensher, and Swait 2000; Kanninen 2007), in which a person is 
asked to consider an environmental commodity that is defi ned by several attributes. 
The respondent is presented with discrete options that represent different bundles 
of the attribute levels and asked to select a preferred alternative. A defi ning char-
acteristic of choice experiments is that a respondent completes multiple choice 
tasks and selects from three or more options during each task. While contingent 
valuation and choice experiments share many design elements, the incentives they 
present to respondents can differ. At the risk of some confusion, we use stated 
preference and contingent valuation somewhat interchangeably in this essay, both 
for continuity with the earlier debates and for simplicity. We stress, however, that 
insights from choice experiments represent an increasingly important component 
of the literature.
Stated preference surveys typically share similar structures. To value a specifi c 
policy change that moves an environmental resource from one well-defi ned state to 
another, the survey needs to fi rst describe the environmental good to respondents 
in a way that is understandable for a lay participant while remaining true to the 
underlying science. It then needs to communicate the existing level of environ-
mental quality as well as the change being proposed and, fi nally, the specifi c policy 
intervention that will be used to bring about the change. After the commodity has 
been described, a survey will typically explain the constructed market and method of 
payment. A best practice for contingent valuation is to describe the market as a refer-
endum in which the respondents are asked whether they would vote for or against 
the project in a public vote. Since the answer to a question of this type provides only 
an upper or lower bound on a respondent’s value, statistical methods are used to 
translate this information into an estimate of the distribution of economic value in 
the population (Haab and McConnell 2002).
A critical part of the referendum question design is the posted price that the 
respondent is “offered” in considering whether to vote for the project. A careful 
experimental design is necessary for effi cient estimation of mean willingness-to-
pay estimates and large sample sizes are generally needed to achieve the desired 
precision. Other constructed market details include the conditions for provision 
(for example, whether a majority must vote in favor) and timing of the project. 
When presenting the posted price, the survey should also describe the method of 
payment, which can be coercive or voluntary. The former is usually preferred and 
includes, for example, changes in property tax rates, surcharges on utility bills, or 
generally assessed fees. The respondent completes the survey by reading the mate-
rial describing the issue and then deciding, based on personal preferences and her 
budget constraint, whether to vote “yes” or “no.”
Though it is relatively straightforward to describe the components of a contin-
gent valuation study, actual implementation requires attention to many details. 
Current best practice for survey design involves the iterative use of focus groups, 
one-on-one interviews, and pre-testing to verify that the commodity description and 
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constructed market are appropriate for the purposes of the research. A premium 
is placed on a high level of specifi city in the good being valued and the program 
being evaluated, since vague or abstract descriptions have been shown to lead to 
unreliable responses. Also, it is generally accepted that the exercise should seek 
to value the policy package broadly, rather than the change in the commodity 
narrowly, since context details should matter for how economic value arises. Finally, 
most surveys include questions designed to gauge how well respondents understood 
the material, the confi dence they have in their responses, and the rationality of 
their answers.
To help readers who are unfamiliar with stated preference surveys better 
understand how such surveys are presented to respondents, we provide an abbrevi-
ated version of a contingent valuation question from a study published by Loomis, 
Kent, Strange, Fausch, and Covich (2000) and used as an example in Haab and 
McConnell’s text (2002). The study concerned the valuation of a set of ecosystem 
services that would be generated by the purchase of water rights from landowners 
along the South Platte River in Colorado. Detailed information on the proposed 
plan’s effects on wildlife habitat, erosion control, recreational opportunities, and 
water purifi cation was provided to respondents. An in-person interviewer then 
asked respondents the following:
If the majority of households vote in favor of the South Platte River restoration 
fund, the 45 miles of river would look like (in-person interviewer points to a fi gure 
showing increased water quality and fi sh and wildlife ). If a majority votes against, 
these 45 miles of the South Platte River would remain as they are today, as 
illustrated by (in-person interviewer points to a fi gure showing current management ). 
If the South Platte River restoration fund was on the ballot in the next election 
and it cost your household $B each month in a higher water bill, would you 
vote in favor or against?
The dollar amount $B was randomly fi lled in with one of twelve values ($1, 2, 3, 
5, 8, 10, 12, 20, 30, 40, 50, 100). Based on survey responses from 100 local respon-
dents, Loomis et al. estimated an average willingness to pay of $21 per month or 
over $250 annually per household for the proposal.
Lessons from Theory: When Should Stated Preference Estimates 
Match Real Payments?
Economists have long believed that observation of actual behavior in which 
people bear the consequences of their actions is the key to understanding their 
motives. In turn, this predisposition has given rise to an inclination to doubt the 
accuracy of answers provided in a survey context, particularly if it involves reporting 
more than a factual outcome. Recently, however, researchers have developed theories 
describing how people behave while answering surveys, given the time and cognitive 
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energy needed for the task. This is our point of departure for understanding what 
the necessary conditions are for survey answers to refl ect real economic values.
The main theoretical tool has been mechanism design, applied to the problem 
of understanding when it is in a person’s best interest to thoughtfully and truth-
fully report preferences in a stated preference exercise. In response to a critique 
by Cummings, Harrison, and Rutström (1995) that survey participants do not 
have the incentive to answer stated preference questions accurately, Carson and 
Groves (2007) argue that the necessary conditions for truthful reporting involve 
using an elicitation mechanism that discourages strategic responses, and fi elding 
the survey in a way that encourages respondents to believe that the study’s results 
could ultimately infl uence their well-being. These conditions are known as incentive 
compatibility and consequentiality, respectively. The need for incentive compatibility in 
eliciting responses from the public is not new: theorists have long known that depar-
tures from single-shot, binary, binding outcome choices provide an incentive for 
self-interested participants to depart from selection of their most preferred option. 
Indeed, these arguments are part of what led the NOAA Panel to recommend using 
a binary choice format for contingent valuation elicitation. The last two decades, 
however, have seen a much more complete investigation into the many nuanced 
ways that the design features of a stated preference survey can affect choices.
An important example relates to contributions to public goods. Economic 
theory predicts that, due to the incentive to free ride, a person’s voluntary contribu-
tion to a collective good will be smaller than that person’s true willingness to pay. 
However, this incentive can play out in a surprising form in hypothetical surveys. If 
the respondent believes the survey will be used to decide on the ultimate provision 
of a public good, that person will have incentive to report more than true willing-
ness to pay in a voluntary elicitation in which payment is not binding, in order to 
infl uence provision so as to have the opportunity to free ride—and contribute less 
than stated—should the provision become a reality. For example, Champ, Bishop, 
Brown, and McCollum(1997) fi nd in a fi eld experiment that hypothetical willing-
ness to donate is substantially larger than the donations they actually collected for a 
public good with mainly nonuse value, though they are not able to compare either 
to estimates of the true willingness to pay.
Concern about the role of consequentiality in stated preference survey research 
arose relatively recently (Carson and Groves 2007). Rather than assuming that respon-
dents have the incentive to answer untruthfully (or truthfully), the consequentiality 
argument suggests that there are no predictable incentives for an inconsequential 
survey. Specifi cally, if the respondent has no reason to believe that her answers will 
infl uence an outcome that she cares about (either directly, or indirectly by how the 
survey results are used), there is no reason to expect that the respondent has dedi-
cated effort to the process, and so the meaningfulness of that person’s answers cannot 
be judged. In contrast, if the survey is consequential in the sense that the respondent 
thinks its conclusions may ultimately infl uence something that the respondent cares 
about, she will have incentive to devote effort. In this case, the truthfulness of the 
respondent’s answers hinges on other factors related to the incentive compatibility 
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and other characteristics of the survey. Continuing the public good example from 
above, the person has incentive to bid more than her true willingness to pay in the 
hypothetical voluntary payment survey only if she believes such an act will infl uence 
the probability of the good being provided. Absent this condition, there is no predic-
tion we can make about how the respondent will answer the survey question. Herriges, 
Kling, Liu, and Tobias (2010) show that estimates of economic value from people who 
received a consequentiality reminder are systematically different from those who did 
not. However, empirical work on the effect of consequentiality scripts in stated prefer-
ence surveys is in its infancy.
In short, careful study of the incentives at work when people answer stated 
preference questions helps us understand when such answers should be expected to 
match the behavior that would occur in a real payment situation. In hypothetical 
surveys, respondents must be faced with an incentive-compatible instrument and 
must believe the survey to be consequential, both in terms of affecting the provision 
of the good and in terms of creating a binding payment commitment. If a stated 
preference study does not satisfy the conditions under which responses should be 
expected to match those of a real exchange, then an observed mismatch should not 
be counted as evidence against the effi cacy of stated preference methods. Of course, 
the corollary is also true: if these conditions are met, then a mismatch provides 
strong evidence of failings in the method.
Lessons From Behavioral Economics: Are the Challenges Unique to 
Stated Preference?
Most economists use the neoclassical paradigm of rational, optimizing agents 
to analyze observed outcomes, including survey responses. The last two decades, 
however, have seen the emergence of behavioral economics—a competing paradigm 
that seeks to explain persistent departures from neoclassical predictions. This raises 
a question for stated preference methods: if behavioral anomalies are observed 
in stated preference outcomes, is it because of a failure of the stated preference 
method or a failure of the neoclassical paradigm to supply correct predictions 
for comparison? In this section, we describe fi ndings from research in behavioral 
economics that need to be considered when we evaluate the accuracy of stated pref-
erence methods.
The fi ndings of behavioral economics can be grouped into two broad catego-
ries: 1) individual preferences may not be well-behaved in the neoclassical sense 
and/or 2) individuals do not always optimize when making choices. Departures 
from neoclassical preferences come in many guises. One example that is particu-
larly relevant for stated preference is the endowment effect, which predicts that 
people require more compensation to part with something already in possession 
than they would give up to newly acquire it. This can explain the large divergence 
in willingness to pay and willingness to accept that is often observed in stated prefer-
ence surveys, and which is sometimes cited as evidence of the method’s failings. 
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A further example concerns “warm glow,” which is the name given to the private 
value a person receives from the action of contributing to a worthy cause beyond 
the actual value of the good the contribution provides. The role of warm glow has 
been hotly debated in the stated preference literature, and its existence was cited 
by Diamond and Hausman (1994) as a major defi ciency in the contingent valuation 
method. Warm glow is now understood to be one of many reasons for pro-social 
behaviors such as contributing to public goods (Schokkaert 2006). Social norms 
and other-regarding preferences such as altruism and reciprocity can also lead 
individuals to value an environmental good more than its private benefi ts, in hypo-
thetical as well as real settings. Finally, new results on choices under uncertainty, 
such as over-weighting small probabilities, are almost certainly relevant for under-
standing how people respond to survey questions about environmental programs 
since environmental outcomes are generally uncertain.
Departures from optimizing behavior can also occur for several reasons. We 
highlight two that are particularly relevant for valuing public goods. First, people 
may make “mistakes” in general due to bounded rationality and bounded self-
control. For example, in the theory of mental accounting (Thaler 1990), money 
is not fungible across all categories of expenses, meaning multiple budgets 
constrain different types of behavior. Payments for environmental services in this 
context are not necessarily constrained by the overall budget, but instead by an 
expense category that may be more or less binding than fully rational optimization 
would imply. Li, Berrens, Bohara, Jenkins-Smith, Silva, and Weimer (2005) offer 
a piece of evidence for mental accounting in contingent valuation: They found 
that respondents had lower willingness to pay for reduction of global warming 
when they received reminders about their discretionary income and its use for 
environmental causes, compared with when they received reminders about their 
household budget only.
Second, rationality may be the result of repeated participation in markets, 
where mistakes are costly and individuals learn, rather than an intrinsic charac-
teristic of individual decisionmakers. Departures from rationality can therefore 
be aggravated by complex or unfamiliar decision environments and uncertain-
ties, which often result in rule-of-thumb behaviors (Iyengar and Kamenica 2007). 
Although such departures are prevalent in experiments and in fi eld studies of 
individual choices, stated preference surveys might be more prone to anomalies for 
two reasons: choices in inconsequential surveys might not be salient and not subject 
to regulation by institutions, and survey respondents might not have much experi-
ence with the environmental goods being valued or with the choice circumstances. 
However, such anomalies can be alleviated by consumer experience (Whitehead, 
Bloomquiest, Hoban, and Crawford 1995; List 2003), and perhaps by competitive 
institutions (Slembeck and Tyran 2004). For example, Cherry, Crocker, and Shogren 
(2003) showed that market-induced rationality spills over to nonmarket valuations: 
subjects disciplined by real market-like arbitrage showed lower rates of preference 
reversals, and the reduced rates carried over to hypothetical settings with money as 
well as wildlife lotteries.
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These developments in behavioral economics offer a richer set of testable 
hypotheses and interpretations of evidence in contingent valuation studies. The 
alternative paradigm may be useful for explaining the highly heterogeneous and 
sometimes nonrational individual outcomes observed in stated preference surveys 
and experiments, even when aggregate outcomes conform to expectations. In this 
sense, behavioral insights are useful for providing input into the design and evaluation 
of stated preference surveys (Shogren and Taylor 2008). However, these new theories 
also raise fundamental questions about validity tests and research design. For instance, 
if choices are context dependent, preferences formed in exchange institutions might 
differ from those formed in nonmarket settings (Bowles 1998). This observation casts 
doubt on the standard practice of comparing estimates from surveys with those from 
market data, and it challenges the presumption that the latter should automatically 
be preferred for use in policy analysis and damage assessment, given that some values 
are not formed from markets. The conundrum is that one must choose a behavioral 
paradigm fi rst—for example, behavior based on neoclassical preferences or behavior 
based on reference-dependent preferences—and then design and implement a study 
to test the accuracy of a stated preference estimate based on that paradigm. If the 
fi ndings of the accuracy test are negative, this may provide evidence that the stated 
preference method is inaccurate or that an incorrect behavioral paradigm was chosen.
Empirical Evidence on Validity
How can we assess the empirical accuracy of stated preference methods? In 
most instances there is no observable “true” value against which an estimate can 
be judged, and so researchers have devised other means of looking at the accuracy 
of their estimates. Using defi nitions from the American Psychological Association, 
Mitchell and Carson (1989) introduced the concept of “validity” in the context of 
stated preferences. The validity of a method is essentially the degree to which it 
correctly measures the theoretical construct under consideration. Table 1 contains 
a summary of the validity concepts that have now become standard in the literature. 
A generic defi nition of each type of validity is provided in question form in the 
second column, and in the third column we present an example of the question 
in the specifi c context of assessing the validity of stated preference studies. We 
consider each type of validity in turn.
Criterion Validity: Do Stated Preferences Estimates Match Real Payments?
Tests for criterion validity compare the prediction from a stated preference 
exercise to a standard that is thought to be a suitable proxy for the true measure-
ment objective, which typically involves real payments. In many ways, this validity 
concept is the most central and salient. Criterion validity has mainly been assessed 
in the literature using experimental methods in the laboratory and fi eld, but there 
are also a small number of studies that have timed stated preference studies to 
coincide with an actual binding referendum.
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Two types of laboratory experiments have been used to gauge criterion validity. 
In the fi rst, participants are assigned a value for the experimental good as part of 
the research design. This design allows the researcher to know with certainty the 
criterion against which real and hypothetical statements of value are compared. 
Because the value is assigned to the respondent, as opposed to it having arisen 
internally from the respondent’s own preferences, this is known as an “induced 
value experiment.” An advantage of this protocol is that it allows one to focus on 
value elicitation, as distinct from value formation. Induced value experiments have 
primarily been used to examine the accuracy of hypothetical referendum-style elici-
tation vehicles relative to binding real payment votes (for example, Taylor, McKee, 
Laury, and Cummings 2001; Vossler and McKee 2006; Murphy, Stevens, and Yadav 
2010). The results generally show that the distribution of values from hypothetical 
votes matches the induced-value criterion in aggregate. These fi ndings suggest that 
a necessary condition for stated preference criterion validity is met. Specifi cally, 
when we abstract from the value formation step, there is robust evidence that indi-
viduals can be induced to reveal their private willingness to pay for a public good in 
a properly designed hypothetical situation.
In the second type of experiment, participants’ actual values for a real 
commodity are used as the criterion. These are known as “homegrown value 
experiments” because participants’ own (or homegrown) preferences are the basis 
for establishing the standard for comparison. In the typical experiment, the crite-
rion is established by a real payment mechanism. For a public good, this takes a 
referendum format in which all participants must pay a given amount if a majority 
Table 1
Summary of Validity Concepts for Stated Preference Methods
Criterion Generic question Specifi c question
Criterion validity Does the measure relate favorably to 
other measures that are considered 
legitimate criteria (i.e., are believed 
to be accurate)?
Is the estimate generated by stated 
preference methods the same as a 
willingness-to-pay value that would be 
generated if real payment was made?
Convergent validity Does the measure correlate well with 
other measures of the same thing?
Is the estimate generated by a stated 
preference method the same as 
the willingness-to-pay value that is 
estimated from a revealed preference 
method?
Construct validity Does the measure correlate 
as expected to other measures as 
predicted by theory?
Does the estimate generated by a 
stated preference method relate to 
income, prices, and other variables in 
the way economic theory predicts?
Content validity Does the measure adequately cover 
the construct’s domain?
Does the estimate arise from the best 
study design practices—including 
scenario description, econometric 
analysis, elicitation format, follow up 
questions, etc.?
From Exxon to BP: Has Some Number Become Better than No Number?     15
votes in favor. The results from hypothetical elicitation formats are then compared 
to the real payment mechanism as a test of validity. A consistent fi nding for this 
type of experiment is that stated values are higher than their real counterparts; 
this phenomenon has become known as hypothetical bias. Meta-analyses by List and 
Gallet (2001) and Murphy, Allen, Stevens, and Weatherheard (2005) have examined 
hypothetical bias quantitatively by looking at nearly 30 different lab and fi eld studies 
that contain both actual and hypothetical estimates of a good’s value. List and Gallet 
fi nd for their sample that hypothetical values exceed actual values on average by a 
factor of three, while Murphy et al. fi nd the average to be skewed by a few outliers 
and therefore present a median bias factor of 1.35. More qualitatively, Harrison 
and Rutström (2008) report that 34 of the 39 studies they surveyed showed upward 
bias in the hypothetical values. This robust evidence on the existence of hypothet-
ical bias in homegrown value experiments lends support to the notion of criterion 
invalidity. The nonvalidity conclusion is also supported by fi eld experiments that 
include real and hypothetical elicitations for private goods (for example, List 2001; 
Blumenschein, Blomquist, Johannesson, Horn, and Freeman 2008).
One diffi culty in interpreting this set of fi ndings is that not all the studies 
used in these assessments satisfy the incentive compatibility and consequentiality 
requirements identifi ed by Carson and Groves (2007) as the necessary conditions 
for stated responses to match the actual values. For example, Vossler and Evans 
(2009) fi nd that hypothetical bias disappears from their homegrown value lab 
experiments when the stated preference elicitation method makes participants feel 
that their answers are more consequential. Likewise, Landry and List (2007) fi nd 
that hypothetical bias disappears from their fi eld experiments when respondents 
are provided with a script emphasizing the consequentiality of the results before 
answering the value elicitation question. These results jibe well with nonexperi-
mental evidence suggesting that surveys including explicit discussions on how the 
results might infl uence policy produce different estimates than those that do not 
(as in Herriges, Kling, Liu, and Tobias 2010).
Nonetheless, the persistent divergence identifi ed in homegrown value experi-
ments has spawned a large literature dedicated to understanding its causes and 
fi nding ways to mitigate its effects. This literature is important for our assessment in 
that if research can discover a means of eliminating hypothetical bias or predicting 
its magnitude, the criterion validity of stated preference methods may ultimately be 
established. For example, one approach is the “cheap talk” method in which partici-
pants are explicitly warned of the tendency among people to infl ate hypothetically 
reported values (for example, Cummings and Taylor 1999; List 2001). Over 30 lab 
and fi eld experiments fi nd that while “cheap talk” can be moderately effective in 
some circumstances, its net impact varies with the characteristics of participants 
and the commodity, and the type of script used. The main other alternative, which 
seems to show more promise, is to calibrate the answers in some way after they have 
been collected. In one version of this technique, respondents are asked to rate the 
confi dence they have in their answers after completing the elicitation task, which is 
usually a response to a posted price. Qualitative ranks (for example, “very certain,” 
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“certain,” “uncertain,” and do on) as well as multipoint certainty scales have been 
used, and in most experiments the distribution of hypothetically obtained values 
can be made to match the distribution of actual values when the uncertain “yes” 
responses are recoded to “no” responses. Thus, the evidence suggests that one 
source of hypothetical bias may be in the form of yea-saying by uncertain respon-
dents. Morrison and Brown (2009) provide a summary and reference list of studies 
related to both the cheap talk, and certainty scale follow-up, methods. Newer vehi-
cles continue to be proposed for minimizing hypothetical bias ( Jacquemet, Joule, 
Luchini, and Shogren forthcoming; Cameron and DeShazo forthcoming; Bateman, 
Burgess, Hutchison, and Matthews 2008).
A fi nal piece of evidence regarding criterion validity comes from stated 
preference studies that were conducted in conjunction with actual binding, 
local referenda. Of these studies, Johnston (2006) is the purest test of criterion 
validity (and the role of consequentiality) in that the stated preference exercise 
was executed prior to a local binding referendum and was fi elded in an advisory 
role as input into deciding whether a village in Rhode Island should proceed with 
the installation of a new water system. Vossler and Kerkvliet (2003) also conduct 
a survey prior to a binding referendum. Their case study is a 1998 vote over a 
$9.5 million bond measure, funded by higher property taxes, to pay for improve-
ments to a downtown park in Corvallis, Oregon. In both cases, the researchers fi nd 
that the stated preference predictions match the outcome of the actual election 
without any need for calibration. An additional study of this type from Vossler, 
Kerkvliet, Polasky, and Gainutdinova (2003) found that, if undecided respondents 
were coded as “no” votes, the stated preference responses were statistically consis-
tent with the referenda results.
How should we interpret the weight of evidence on criterion validity? We have 
seen that hypothetical bias is commonly found in studies where subjects’ personal 
values form the basis of comparison. On the surface, this provides clear evidence of 
criterion invalidity for contingent valuation studies. However, a number of steps may 
be possible to reduce this bias. To the extent that the bias is caused by participants 
not feeling that their responses matter, stated preference surveys and experiments 
could be run with designs that provide the proper incentives for subjects to respond 
thoughtfully. Vossler and Poe (2011) take this a step further when they suggest that 
criterion validity tests that were conducted without adherence to consequentiality 
requirements should not be considered when assessing the potential for hypo-
thetical bias. They identify four induced value experiments and one homegrown 
value experiment that they judge to be consistent with the Carson and Groves 
(2007) requirements, and note that each of these demonstrates criterion validity. If 
hypothetical bias remains after appropriate consequentiality conditions are met (or 
it is not possible to achieve consequentiality), a combination of calibration based 
on the degree of uncertainty and, to a lesser extent “cheap talk” scripts, might be 
used to manage hypothetical bias in a way that allows stated preference methods 
to approach criterion validity status more closely. Finally, the evidence from stated 
preference surveys and binding referenda supports criterion validity, at least in the 
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case of people making decisions about local public goods. Based on this string of 
fi ndings, it is diffi cult to conclude purely in favor of criterion validity, but also diffi -
cult to reject it outright.
For the sake of argument, suppose we fi nd the existing evidence to be insuffi -
cient to support a conclusion of criterion validity in the pure sense—that is, statistical 
equivalence between a stated preference estimate and the criterion. We would still 
be left with the question as to whether stated preference surveys provide useful 
(albeit imperfect) information for cost–benefi t analysis, policy debates, and/or 
judicial fi ndings. Indeed, statistical equivalence to one estimate of the truth is a strict 
standard that many economic analyses used for policy—including most revealed 
preference estimates, we suspect—would have diffi culty passing. More importantly, 
even limited information may be useful in cost–benefi t analysis, policy discussions, 
and litigation. For example, a simple upper or lower bound on estimates of passive 
use value can sometimes be suffi cient to determine whether a project would pass a 
cost–benefi t analysis. In such a case, a point estimate and knowledge of the direc-
tion of bias can be adequate for evaluation. Likewise, even when benefi t estimates 
are uncertain and the sign of any bias is unknown, the magnitude of the point 
estimate relative to cost estimates (which are also likely to be subject to a range of 
uncertainties) may provide useful input for policymakers and stakeholders.
Convergent Validity: Are Stated and Revealed Preference Estimates the Same?
Convergent validity refers to how well a stated preference estimate correlates 
with other measures of the same economic value. The most common type of 
convergent validity tests compare stated preference estimates to those from other 
techniques, usually based on revealed preferences. Convergent validity tests of this 
type are not possible for passive use values, but they can be carried out in other 
instances, such as when the measurement objective concerns a private or quasi-
public good. A good example of this is the value of recreation resources, and many 
studies have used both stated and revealed preference to examine how the environ-
ment conveys value through recreation. If the values match, or diverge in expected 
directions for expected reasons, the estimates are said to be convergent valid. Of 
course, both estimates may be wrong! Still, if convergence occurs we might have 
more confi dence in both methods, when they are appropriately applied. In terms 
of evidence, an older meta-analysis from Carson, Flores, Martin, and Wright (1996) 
supports the notion of convergent validity. Many individual studies have since been 
done to study convergent validity between specifi c types of stated and revealed pref-
erence data. In some instances, researchers test for the equivalence of econometric 
parameters, and in others they test for the statistical equality of economic value esti-
mates. While exceptions exist, our sense is that studies that focus on the equivalence 
of economic values are generally consistent with the fi ndings from Carson, Flores, 
Martin, and Wright (1996).
In contemporary research, tests of convergent validity per se have given way to a 
more general focus on econometric methods that allow the two types of data to be 
combined in the same model to exploit their relative strengths. This literature is 
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surveyed in a book-length treatment by Whitehead, Haab, and Huang (2011). Here, 
we merely note that the growth of such methods in environmental and nonenviron-
mental fi elds is predicated on the implicit acceptance of convergent validity—or 
at least a common data-generating process—by a wide spectrum of researchers. 
Two prominent examples include Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004), who use both 
actual purchases and stated intentions to estimate the demand for new car purchases, 
and Small, Winston, and Yan’s (2005) use of both stated and revealed preference data 
to estimate commuters’ demand for travel characteristics. Given this, we interpret the 
weight of evidence on convergent validity to be generally positive.
Construct Validity: Are Stated Preference Estimates Consistent with Theoretical 
Predictions?
Prior to the experimental revolution and the advent of research using both 
stated and revealed preference methods, consideration of construct validity—the 
extent to which predictions from stated preference experiments are consistent with 
theory—was the main means by which the effi cacy of stated preference was assessed. 
For example, one issue strongly debated in the 1994 JEP symposium by Diamond 
and Hausman (1994) and Hanemann (1994) concerns “embedding effects”— that 
is, whether and to what degree willingness to pay for environmental goods should 
vary with their size. This has become known as the issue of “scope.”
Most of the theory used to evaluate stated preference validity was based on 
price changes involving private goods, as this was the type of good theretofore 
most studied by economists. This generated testable predictions and assertions 
that 1) the proportion of people willing to contribute to an environmental good 
in a stated preference survey should increase when the requested payment amount 
falls; 2) people should be willing to pay more to have a higher quantity of the 
good—that is, estimates should exhibit positive response to scope; 3) the income 
elasticity of willingness to pay should be larger than one, because environmental 
quality is best viewed as a luxury good; and 4) willingness to pay and willingness 
to accept for environmental changes should not be substantially different. While 
the fi rst of these holds true in almost all stated preference studies, the remaining 
three were often violated for stated preference data—particularly early studies of 
sensitivity to scope and most studies comparing estimates of willingness to pay and 
willingness to accept.
These violations were often cited as evidence of construct invalidity. However, 
additional work in economic theory since the Exxon spill has shown that predic-
tions 2, 3, and 4 are sensitive to two common features of environmental goods: 
fi xed quantities and limited substitutability with other consumption goods. For 
example, while the marginal willingness to pay curve for a fi xed quantity—like a 
given level of environmental quality—is downward sloping as expected, its relation-
ship to income imbeds several distinct effects. Flores and Carson (1997) show that 
the income elasticity of willingness to pay for an environmental good depends on 
three adjustment margins: the implied income elasticity of demand for the envi-
ronmental good, the substitutability among all the quantity-constrained goods, and 
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the share of augmented income allocated to market goods. Numerical examples 
are used to show that an income elasticity of willingness to pay that is less than one is 
in many plausible circumstances consistent with an income elasticity of demand for 
the fi xed quantity that is greater than one. In a similar spirit, Amiran and Hagen 
(2010) show that bounded substitution between market and environmental goods 
can result in rational behavior failing to exhibit sensitivity to scope, thereby altering 
prediction 2 for environmental goods.
Recent empirical results on scope effects deserve mention since the early 
critiques of stated preference methods were based on fi ndings in some studies that 
estimates of economic value did not go up when the scale of the environmental 
good was increased. As sensitivity to scope became a litmus test for the construct 
validity of stated preference estimates, many post-Exxon studies were specifi cally 
designed to include “scope tests.” Meta-analyses of these studies from Smith and 
Osborne (1996), Carson (1997), Brouwer, Langford, Bateman, and Turner (1999), 
and Ojea and Loureiro (2011) show that scope effects are typically present in well-
executed studies.
The persistently observed gap between willingness to pay and willingness to 
accept estimates in stated preference studies also deserves mention. Although 
Hanemann (1991) and Zhao and Kling (2009) suggest two different theories that 
can rationalize such a gap without implying construct invalidity from a neoclassical 
perspective, the size of the difference in many studies appears implausible. Is the 
divergence due mainly to the hypothetical nature of stated preference surveys? The 
evidence suggests no. Horowitz and McConnell (2002) reviewed 45 studies and 
found no difference in the divergence between hypothetical experiments and real 
experiments. That is, the divergence is not due to the hypothetical nature of stated 
preference surveys. Although the divergence has been found to be sensitive to the 
experimental settings (as in Plott and Zeiler 2005) and experience (as in List 2003), 
the evidence continues to point to alternative preference structures such as the 
endowment effect. Thus, the divergence does not automatically translate into viola-
tions of construct validity, though it may require reconsideration of what theoretical 
paradigm is used to analyze behavior.
In sum, advances over the last two decades have shown that a combination 
of neoclassical and behavioral economic theory can give rise to a wider range of 
predictions that are consistent with the fi ndings of stated preference studies. Of 
course, the fact that a wider range of outcomes is theoretically consistent does not 
validate all possible magnitudes of such outcomes. Even with this caveat, a casual 
browsing of contemporary state-of-the-art stated preference studies suggests that 
they are almost always consistent with the predictions noted above. For example, 
the relationship between the posted price and the probability of a “yes” vote is 
almost universally negative, income effects are robustly positive, and scope criteria 
are usually met. The anomalous fi ndings that remain—like the divergence between 
willingness to pay and accept—arise broadly in other forms of microeconomic data 
and are therefore of little value in considering the construct validity of stated prefer-
ence methods.
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Nonetheless, as new approaches to stated preference elicitation arise, construct 
validity concerns can reappear and will need careful attention. For example, the 
mechanism design framework predicts that ordering effects will be present when 
individuals respond to multiple choice tasks, as is the case with choice experiments. 
Ordering effects in choice experiments have indeed been confi rmed empirically (Day 
et al. 2012). Thus, a research challenge is to assess how commonly used departures 
from incentive compatibility compromise predictions from choice experiments.
Content Validity: Is Best Practice Being Followed?
The fi nal type of validity we consider relates to how effectively a stated prefer-
ence study adheres to the current state of the art. This topic is relevant for our review 
insomuch as the notion of state of the art has changed dramatically since the imme-
diate post-Exxon days. The two decades since then have seen an explosion of stated 
preference work. At a minimum, this means the stock of accumulated wisdom—for 
example, how people react to a particular payment mechanism, how environmental 
concepts are best communicated in lay language—is orders of magnitude greater 
than it was. As mentioned above, there are now several how-to books on stated pref-
erence methods that provide survey development steps, numerous examples, and 
advice on avoiding known pitfalls. Given this, genuine surprises in purely applied 
studies are now rare; the method has matured and become more standardized, and 
practitioners now have a much better sense of the important design elements of a 
stated preference survey.
Evidence for this point is apparent when we look at how the challenges 
identifi ed in the early debates on the method have been researched and fi ndings 
incorporated in a new understanding of best practice. We provide three specifi c 
examples. First, it is now widely accepted that the environmental good needs to be 
described with a high level of specifi city, and the status quo and changed levels of 
the good precisely defi ned in a way that lay respondents can understand and place 
in context. This information is usually presented via a combination of text, photos, 
graphics, and numbers that has been deliberately developed using focus groups, 
interviews, and pretests. The increased use of computer-administered surveys has 
provided additional fl exibility for effi ciently explaining the environmental good 
in multiple ways and checking people’s comprehension. A result of this emphasis 
on specifi city (and careful communication) is that contemporary studies almost 
always satisfy sensitivity to scope and other theoretical predictions. A corollary 
is that a vague or abstract commodity defi nition—or inadequate evidence of an 
effective communication strategy—is considered a failure of content validity. 
Thus, while the NOAA panel early on stressed the importance of specifi city 
(Arrow, Solow, Portney, Leamer, Radner, and Schuman 1993), its evolution into 
best practice protocols has occurred incrementally through accumulated experi-
ence in numerous subsequent applications.
A second area in which best practice has evolved relates to how the constructed 
market and payment mechanism are defi ned and interpreted. It is now widely 
accepted that the constructed market should represent a realistic mechanism for 
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bringing about the proposed change, meaning that the size of the change arising 
from the intervention needs to be seen as physically plausible by respondents. Simi-
larly, the payment mechanism needs to be something that respondents fi nd realistic 
and familiar—both so they will take the exercise seriously, and so they can envi-
sion how an actual payment would occur. The attention given to a survey’s policy 
institutions has also led to a consensus among practitioners that estimated values 
are for the entire package—that is, the environmental change in the context of 
the described program, rather than the environmental change in a vacuum. Thus, 
the expectation among current researchers is not that the estimated values should 
be independent of context. Instead, differences should arise based on the specifi cs 
of the program, and validity hinges on the extent to which the differences are 
consistent with theory and intuition.
The fi nal example of change in best practice relates to ways that researchers 
attempt to encourage and/or test for the rationality and truthfulness of respondents’ 
contingent behavior. Understanding of what constitutes an incentive-compatible 
elicitation mechanism has evolved beyond the NOAA panel’s recommendation to 
use a referendum format (Arrow, Solow, Portney, Leamer, Radner, and Schuman 
1993). Researchers now know that design elements related to voluntary versus 
coercive payment, the actual payment vehicle, and commodity provision details 
can matter. Likewise, framing the survey to be consequential, the presentation 
of cheap talk scripts, and the use of certainty follow-up questions have, in various 
combinations, become common practice. In response to advances in theoretical 
understanding, researchers are also less likely to draw conclusions about construct 
validity based on narrowly interpreted tests of scope, income effects, and the sensi-
tivity of value estimates to the details of the constructed market. Instead the criteria 
used to evaluate construct validity are case-specifi c and start with questions about 
the extent to which the specifi c predictions fi t with the specifi c context.
Content validity is a different concept than the other types of validity in that 
we cannot summarize general evidence to conclude that stated preference methods 
are valid or invalid in this dimension. Nonetheless there does seem to be a more 
complete (and a more nuanced) consensus now than two decades ago on the char-
acteristics of a state-of-the-art study. While this does not say much about the general 
accuracy of stated preference methods, it does illustrate that the early areas of 
concern have been well researched and best practice has evolved based on the fi nd-
ings. It is up to the reader to decide if this large volume of work implies we are left 
with an approach that inspires confi dence.
Conclusion
Stated preference techniques are in a much different place in the aftermath of 
the BP accident in 2010 than they were after the Exxon oil spill in 1989. The past 
two decades have seen the coming of age of experimental economics, new theoret-
ical developments, accumulating insights from behavioral economics, and a general 
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maturing of the nonmarket valuation literature. We now have more tools with which 
to judge the accuracy of stated preference estimates and an emerging consensus 
on the criteria we should use to do so. Many of the questions that arose in the post-
Exxon days have been acknowledged and investigated. Those who formulated their 
beliefs about contingent valuation two decades ago, whether positive or negative, 
should update their beliefs based on the research agenda that has unfolded. To help 
readers with this we have prepared Table 2 as our own summary of possible answers 
to the question of whether the stated preference method can provide valid and 
accurate estimates of underlying economics values. While the summary constitutes 
our personal judgments, we have tried to convey the range of views that different 
people might take following an objective reading of the literature.
Before concluding, we note four areas of research that seem especially critical 
for continuing the research agenda related to the validity of stated preference 
methods. First, validity tests that explicitly include the consequentiality dimension 
in their design are relatively young, and more research is needed to determine if 
the initial evidence holds up to further scrutiny. Second, much could be learned by 
subjecting other methods of valuation to the same level of scrutiny that stated pref-
erence methods have received. For example, what methods should be used to assess 
the validity of estimates from hedonic housing or wage studies? How well do recre-
ation demand model estimates stand up to comparisons with actual transactions? 
Table 2
Summary of Authors’ Assessment
Validity concept Assessment Comments
Criterion Some Yes, Some No • Persistence of hypothetical bias in homegrown value 
experiments implies invalidity.
• Emerging consequentiality paradigm suggests potential for 
validity.
• Diffi cult to conclude purely in favor of validity, but also 
diffi cult to outright reject validity.
Convergent Likely Yes • Formal tests often accept revealed and stated preference 
equality. Even when statistically different estimates occur, they 
appear to illustrate common economic phenomena.
• Practice has migrated towards using revealed and stated 
preference data as complements rather than substitutes.
Construct Strongly Yes • Further development of standard theory suggests a wider 
range of outcomes can still be considered neoclassically 
rational.
• New behavioral theories suggest alternative paradigms might 
be needed to assess validity.
• Defi nitive construct validity tests are now more diffi cult to 
formulate.
Content Variable • Content validity is a study-specifi c concept, but the stock of 
accumulated wisdom suggests adherence to best practice is 
now a stronger validity concept than in the past.
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Answers to these questions would enhance their usefulness for cost–benefi t analysis 
generally and improve our ability to assess the relative performance of stated pref-
erence methods. Third, a lot of work remains to be done on understanding how 
the common use of incentive-incompatible designs in choice experiments affects 
the validity of this recently popular approach. Finally, there remains substantial 
uncertainty as to how researchers should execute and interpret validity tests using 
alternative behavioral paradigms. If the same behavioral anomalies appear in both 
stated and actual behavior, should a valid survey mimic real world choices or seek 
to elicit “true” preferences—neoclassical or otherwise—for use in welfare analysis?
Despite these and other questions, our sense is that the last 20 years of research 
have shown that some carefully constructed number based on stated preference 
analysis is now likely to be more useful than no number in most instances for both 
cost–benefi t analysis and damage assessment. Of course this is a weaker conclusion 
than validity, and it is not to say that all studies are equally reliable or that inference 
from reliable studies will always be appropriately applied. But it is illustrative of the 
remarkable progress that stated preference researchers have made, and it serves as 
a model for the evaluation of other policy-critical techniques.
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